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This paper investigates several approaches to equilibrium selection and the relationships
between them. The class of games we study are n-person generalized coordination games
with multiple Pareto rankable strict Nash equilibria. The main result is that all selection
criteria select the same outcome (namely the risk dominant equilibrium) in two-person
games, and that most equivalences break for games with more than two players. All criteria
select the Pareto efﬁcient equilibrium in voting games, of which pure coordination games
are special cases. Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: C70, C72, D82.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Multipleequilibriaarecommonineconomicmodels.Asanexample,consider
the stag hunt game. There are n identical players who must choose simultane-
ously between two actions, H and L. The safe strategy L yields a ﬁxed payoff
x 2 .0;1/. The strategy H yields the higher payoff of 1 if at least · players
choose the same action H, but it yields nothing otherwise. For example, the me-
dian rule takes · to be the smallest integer larger than n/2, while the minimum
rule takes · D n. These games have two strict Nash equilibria in pure strate-
gies, namely, H (all players choose H) and L (all choose L). Which equilibrium
should be selected has provoked much debate.
One might argue that the Pareto-dominant equilibrium H is the focal point,
but recent experimental results by van Huyck et al. (1990, 1991) show that
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whileIwasattheUniversityofCambridge.IthankDavidK.Levineforhisadviceandencouragement.
CommentsfromCostasAzariadis,DrewFudenberg,FrankHahn,AlanKirman,JoeOstroy,JohnRiley,
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subjects frequently fail to coordinate on the Pareto-dominant equilibrium. One
can also question whether H is always the intuitively most appealing solution.
For instance, action L is less risky especially when x and · are large. Harsanyi
and Selten’s (1988; HS henceforth) notion of risk dominance captures this idea
in two-person games. They claim that in these games, L is risk dominant if
and only if x > 1
2. Another approach is Carlsson and van Damme’s (1993a;
CvD henceforth) global perturbations approach. This derives a selection rule
by perturbing the original game with uncertainty about the players’ information
structure and embedding it in a game of incomplete information. In two-by-two
games,CvDshowthattheselectionbasedonglobalperturbationscoincideswith
HS’s risk dominance.




MM show that, if players are sufﬁciently patient, or if each player can revise his
strategy almost at will, a version of dynamic stability leads to the risk dominant
equilibrium. The best response dynamics, which are obtained in the limit as
players become myopic, do not readily distinguish between the two strict Nash
equilibria since both equilibria are asymptotically stable. Young (1993) and
Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993; KMR henceforth) have resolved this indeter-
minacy problem by introducing small random mutations at the individual player
level, thus making the dynamic process stochastic. Foster and Young (1990; FY
henceforth) and Fudenberg and Harris (1992) directly analyze stochastic repli-
catordynamicsinwhichtheprocessbywhichrelativepayoffsaretranslatedinto
strategy adjustments is subject to continual perturbations. Noise causes play to
shift perpetually from the neighborhood of one equilibrium to another. Long run
equilibriaaredeﬁnedtobethestateswhichappearwithnonvanishingprobability
in the limit as the amount of noise vanishes. Each of these evolutionary models
yields its cleanest prediction, namely the risk-dominant equilibrium, in 2 £ 2
coordination games.1
This paper explores games with more than two players. Speciﬁcally, we focus
onn-personbinaryactioncoordinationgameswithtwostrictPareto-rankedNash
1 There are several dynamic models in which the Pareto-dominant equilibrium is selected. Aumann
and Sorin (1989) consider reputation effects in the repeated play of two-player games of common
interests (i.e., games where there is a payoff vector that strongly Pareto dominates all other feasible
payoffs). They show that when the possible types are all pure strategies with bounded recall then
reputation effects pick out the Pareto-dominant outcome. Matsui (1991) considers a large population
randomlymatchedtoplayagameofcommoninterestwithcheaptalk.Heshowsthatauniquecyclically
stable set exists and contains only Pareto-dominant outcome. These works are excluded from our
analysis, since we are concerned with the situation in which a large population anonymously play
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equilibria. Generalization to multiperson games is also motivated by recent ex-
perimentalresultsofvanHuycketal.(1990,1991),whichsuggestthatgroupsize
is important in determining the long run coordination outcome. The purpose of
thispaperistostudyseveralapproachestoequilibriumselection,tocharacterize
fully the selection rules, and to expose the relationship among them. In particu-
lar, we study the following ﬁve models: three models of dynamic/evolutionary
processes (MM, KMR, and FY) and two most salient selection models (HS and
CvD).
The main result is that all selection criteria select the same outcome in two-
person games and that predictions differ from each other in the games with more
thantwoplayers.Weprovidegeometricinterpretationstoclarifywhythecriteria
are equivalent for two-person games but not for more general games. The idea
behind our results can be understood as follows: in KMR or Young, the long run
equilibrium depends only on the relative sizes of the strict equilibria’s basins
of attraction and not on the speed of adjustment in each basin. On the other
hand, evaluation of some weighted integrals of the payoff difference function
is central to characterizing the dynamic outcomes in MM, FY, and Fudenberg
and Harris. All selection criteria coincide when the payoff difference function,
or relative ﬁtness, is linear in the state variable, which is the case only with
a two-person game. In particular, the selected outcome in a two-person game
coincides with the risk-dominant equilibrium. There is no guarantee of equiva-
lenceotherwise.Asacounterexample,welatercharacterizetheselectioncriteria
of different approaches, in the stag hunt game described in the opening para-
graph.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 formally deﬁnes the
game of interest. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium selection criteria applying
the MM, KMR, and FY dynamics. Section 4 investigates the most salient static
selection criteria, namely HS’s risk dominance and CvD’s global perturbation.
Section 5 compares these criteria, provides geometric interpretations, and pro-
poses concrete answers to stag hunt games. Section 6 shows that all dynamic
selectioncriteriastudiedinthispapersupportPareto-dominanceinvotinggames,
of which pure coordination games are special cases. The ﬁnal section concludes
with some comments.
2. THE GAME
We consider a symmetric coordination game G.n;5/, where n is the number
of players and 5 is the payoff matrix. Each player has binary choices available,
denotedbyhigh(H)andlow(L).Considerasituationinwhich.k¡1/opponents
choose H with the remaining .n¡k/ opponents choosing L. Let ¼H
k and ¼L
n¡kC1,
where 1 · k · n, denote the payoff for a player taking H and L, respectively,206 YOUNGSE KIM
where subscripts denote the total numbers of players choosing the strategy in
superscripts.Theclassofgamesbeingstudiedisdescribedbythespaceofpayoff
matrices as























where <2n is the 2n-dimensional Euclidean space. The ﬁrst set of inequalities
in Eq. (1) imply that a player taking a particular action is no worse off when the
numberofopponentstakingthesameactionincreases.Thenexttwoinequalities
require that all players playing a common action constitutes a strict Nash equi-
librium. The last inequality means that the equilibrium when all players play H,
denoted by H, is better than the one when all players play L, denoted by L. The
following preliminary result is straightforward.
LEMMA 1. If 5 2 Ä then the only pure strategy equilibria of G.n;5/are
the two strict Nash equilibria, viz. H and L.
All the proofs are set out in the Appendix.
3. DYNAMIC SELECTIONS
We deal with three types of dynamic processes, namely MM, KMR, and FY
inturn,tocalculateequilibriumselectionrulesinthegame G.n;5/.Tothatend,
we illustrate the general features and deﬁnitions common to all three dynamic
processes. Time runs from t D 0t o1 . The game G.n;5/is played repeatedly
in a society with N identical players. The population size N may be ﬁnite or
inﬁnite, and N is divisible by n if ﬁnite. At every point in time, each player
is matched to form a group with the other .n ¡ 1/ players, who are randomly
drawn from the population playing the game anonymously. There is inertia in
the sense that not every player is able to change his strategy at will. Given
the chance to switch actions, players choose a best response with respect to
some suitably deﬁned objective function. Because of anonymity, they engage
in this optimization without taking into account strategic considerations such as
reputation, punishment, and forward induction.
Let yt denote the fraction of the players that are committed to action H at
time t, where the state space is Y µ [0;1]. Given the state y, let 5H.y/ and
5L.y/ denote the value of playing action H and L, respectively. We derive the
payoff difference function, 8N.y/, using the following deﬁnitions of coefﬁcientCOORDINATION EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 207
functions: if N is ﬁnite,2
°k.y j N/ D
8
> > > > > > > > > > > > <
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; k D n:
If N is inﬁnite,
°k.y j1 /Dy
k ¡ 1. 1¡y /
n ¡ kD lim
N!1
°k.y j N/:











°k.y j N/Ák; (2)
where Ák ´ ¼H
k ¡ ¼L
n¡kC1 is increasing in k. We suppress the subscript N or 1
in 8 whenever there is no confusion.
3.1. Matsui and Matsuyama
We begin with the MM dynamics. Time is continuous. The population is a
continuum, i.e., N D1 , so the state space is Y D [0;1]. If we make N ﬁnite,
we still obtain a similar result. The key assumption is that not every player
can switch actions at will. More speciﬁcally, we assume that the opportunity
to switch actions arrives randomly, following a Poisson process with parameter
¸, the mean arrival rate. It is further assumed that this process is independent
across the players and that there is no aggregate uncertainty. Due to the costly
adjustmentassumption,thesocialbehaviorpattern yt changescontinuouslyover
time with its rate of change belonging to [¡¸yt;¸.1¡y t/]. Furthermore, any
2 Let z denote the number of players choosing action H. To avoid unnecessary complications, we
may assume the case where n · z < N ¡n. The formula for °k.y j N/ is derived simply by changing
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feasible path necessarily satisﬁes y0e¡¸t · yt · 1 ¡ .1 ¡ y0/e¡¸t, where the
initial condition y0 is given exogenously.
Whentheopportunitytoswitcharrives,playerschoosetheactionwhichresults
in the higher expected discounted payoffs, recognizing the future path of y as
wellastheirowninabilitytoswitchactionscontinuously.Giventheopportunity,
players commit to play H if Vt > 0, L if Vt < 0 and are indifferent if Vt D 0,
where





withr > 0beingthediscountrate.Wedeﬁne½ ´ r/¸tobetheeffectivediscount
rate or the degree of friction. Therefore, fytgt2[0;1/ is an equilibrium path from







¸.1 ¡ yt/ if Vt > 0;
[ ¡ ¸yt;¸.1¡y t/]i f V t D 0 ;
¡ ¸ y t if Vt < 0;
for any t. This states that all players currently playing action H (respectively L)
switch, if given the chance, to L (resp. H), when Vt < (resp. >)0 .
MM specify the stability concept as follows. A state y is called accessible
from y0, if an equilibrium path from y0 that reaches or converges to y exists. It
is called globally accessible if it is accessible from any y0 2 [0;1]. A state y
is called absorbing3 if a neighborhood U of y exists such that any equilibrium
path from U converges to y.I ti sfragile if not absorbing.4
To state the properties of the state y D 0 and y D 1, let us deﬁne the partition
.Ä0.n;½/;Ä1.n;½/;Ä01.n;½//of the set Ä. For this purpose, let ® denote an
n-dimensional vector whose kth element is ®k, k D 1;2;:::;n;and the vector
¯ is similarly deﬁned. Also, let “¢” denote the inner product of two vectors. For















3 Although this is the same concept as asymptotically stable according to standard terminology in
dynamical systems, we simply use absorbing due to the presence of multiple paths. It should be noted
that this has nothing to do with Markov processes.
4 MM remarked that the deﬁnition does not rule out the possibility that a state may be both fragile
andgloballyaccessible,orthatastatemaybeuniquelyabsorbingbutnotgloballyaccessible.However,











;¯ k . n ;½/´® n¡kC1.n;½/: .7/
Lemma4intheAppendixprovidesthepropertiesofthecoefﬁcientvector®.n;½/
and ¯.n;½/. We suppress .n;½/in deﬁning the partitioned set whenever there
is no confusion.
LEMMA 2. The state y is globally accessible iff 5 2 Äy for either y D 0
or y D 1; both y D 1 and y D 0 are absorbing iff 5 2 Ä01. Moreover, if an
absorbing state, y, is globally accessible, then it is a unique absorbing state in
[0;1] and any other state must be fragile.
Lemma 2 states that, for a given ½, if the payoff matrix lies in the region
Ä0.n;½/, then y D 0 is absorbing. It also implies that there are either one or two
absorbing states and that a state is uniquely absorbing if and only if it is globally
accessible. In summary, for any initial behavior patterns, there is an equilibrium
path that converges to the state of everyone choosing L, and, if a sufﬁciently
largefractionofpopulationchooseLinitially,anyequilibriumpathconvergesto
that state. Similarly, for a given ½, if the payoff matrix is in the region Ä1.n;½/,
then y D 1 is absorbing. If the payoff matrix lies in the region Ä01.n;½/,o n
the other hand, both states are absorbing. Proposition 1(a) states that, as friction
vanishes, one state becomes fragile and the other becomes globally accessible.
TheregionsÄ0 andÄ1 shrinkasfrictiongrowsand,inthelimitasfrictiongoesto
inﬁnity, disappear. Proposition 1(b) states that, in the presence of large friction,
both states become absorbing.











; k D 1;2;:::;n;
there exists ²>0such that y D 1 is uniquely absorbing and globally accessible
for any ½ 2 .0;²/.If the inequality is reversed, the same statement holds with
y D 0. In the nongeneric case of equality, both y D 0 and y D 1 are absorbing
for any ½>0.
(b) For any 5 2 Ä, there exists ´>0such that both y D 0 and y D 1 are
absorbing and no state is globally accessible for any ½>´ .
Recall that the smaller (larger) size of ½ implies more (less) patience and/or a
shorter (longer) duration of an action commitment.5 The smaller the degree of
5 MM pointed out the following feature of the dynamics. That r ! 0 implies that players are more210 YOUNGSE KIM
friction, ½, gets, the more the long run equilibrium tends to rely on the payoff
matrix speciﬁcation and the less on the initial position of strategic uncertainty,
and vice versa.6 On the other extreme case of ½ approaching inﬁnity, called the
bestresponsedynamics,bothstatesmayobtaininthelongrunandexactlywhich
one would come out depends solely upon what the initial state was. In fact, the
dynamic paths would be close to those studied in Gilboa and Matsui (1991).
3.2. Kandori, Mailath, and Rob
Next we study the KMR dynamic with n ¸ 2 players matching. Time is
discrete, but Kandori (1991) veriﬁes that the results derived by KMR are robust
when extended to a continuous time formulation. Population size N is ﬁnite,
and the state space is Y Df 0 ;1/N;:::;1¡1/N;1g. Within period t, there are a
largenumberofrandommatchesamongtheplayerssothateachplayer’saverage
payoff in that period is equal to the expected payoff.
Consider the MM dynamics in which players become myopic. Together with
the inertia assumption, this implies that, given the chance to move, each player
adopts a best response against the current strategy conﬁguration of the society
as a whole. In other words, players commit to action H if 8.yt/>0, and to
action L if 8.yt/<0. A deterministic Darwinian dynamic ytC1 D f .yt/ is then
deﬁned by
sign. f .y/ ¡ y/ D sign.8.y// for 0 < y < 1:
Since the game G.n;5/has two strict Nash equilibria, the Darwinian dynamic
possesses multiple steady states and that the asymptotic behavior of the system
depends on the initial condition y0. Indeterminacy is resolved if we perturb the
systemwithaconstantﬂowofmutations.Foraﬁxed",wemaydeﬁneastochastic
dynamic by composing the deterministic dynamic f with a random mutation
under which each player’s strategy at time t C 1 is altered to the other action
withprobability".ThestochasticmodelisdescribedbyaMarkovprocess.Since
" is strictly positive, the transition matrix is irreducible and, hence, the Markov
concerned about the future. That ¸ !1might have two opposite effects: players are less concerned
about the future whilst the current strategy distribution becomes less important. Nevertheless, a strictly
positive r guarantees that the second effect always dominates the ﬁrst one. Therefore, the smaller ½
gets, the more players worry about the future.
6 We have assumed that the speed of adjustment, represented by Poisson arrival parameter ¸,i s
identical over the whole population. This does not seem a severe restriction since we have studied
symmetric games. Nevertheless, we can in principle incorporate asymmetric speed of adjustment
into the game of interest G.n;5/by assuming that each population i has a Poisson arrival rate ¸i,
i D 1;2;:::;n. A fair amount of numerical simulations indicate that the equilibrium criterion depends
on these numbers. However, a strong result can be obtained in any—symmetric or not—2 £ 2 games,
which states: “If and only if action H is risk dominant with respect to L (in the sense of larger Nash
product), then H is uniquely absorbing and globally accessible for sufﬁciently small ½i for i D 1;2,
with ½1/½2 D ± ﬁxed.” A proof is available upon request.COORDINATION EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 211
process has the unique steady state distribution which indicates the proportion
oftimethatthesystemspendsoneachstateinY.Astrategyconﬁguration y 2 Y
is deﬁned as a long run equilibrium (LRE) if, as " ! 0, the limit distribution
assigns positive probability on y. KMR show that the LRE corresponds to the
risk dominant equilibrium in two-by-two games.
The following proposition states the selection criterion for n-person general-
ized coordination game G.n;5/. Since the game G.n;5/has two strict equi-
libria,andtherelativesizesofbasinsofattractionsdeterminetheLRE,itmatters
whether or not the payoff difference function 8.y/ cuts the horizontal axis at
a point less than a half. The following proposition generalizes existing results
on two-person games (KMR’s Theorems 3 and 4 and Young’s Theorem 3) to
multiperson games.














for k D 1;:::;n;
there exists an N such that the unique LRE is y D 1 for any N > N. If the
inequality is reversed, the LRE becomes y D 0. In the nongeneric case of
equality, the LRE can be either y D 1 and y D 0, with the limit distribution
placing probability half on each.
3.3. Foster and Young
ThelastdynamicwestudyisFosterandYoung(1990),whichisacknowledged
tobetheﬁrsttoconsiderastochasticdifferentialequationmodelofevolutionary
dynamics. Time is continuous, and the population size N D1 . Given the state
yt, the current rate of increase for H is 5H.y/, while the average rate of increase
of the whole population is y5H.y/ C .1 ¡ y/5L.y/, where 5H and 5L are the
value of playing action H and L, respectively. The relative rate of increase in the







D .1 ¡ yt/8.yt/; (8)
where the payoff difference function 8 is deﬁned in Eq. (2). Equation (8) can
be written as
dyt D yt.1¡yt/8.yt/dt:. 9 /
This system has two asymptotically stable states, namely y D 0 and y D 1,
and exactly which one is obtained depends completely on the initial state y0.F Y212 YOUNGSE KIM
resolve this indeterminacy problem by perturbing the deterministic system with
continual and nonnegligible shocks. We then obtain the following stochastic
differential equation
dyt D yt.1¡yt/8.yt/dt C¾dWt;. 10/
where Wt is a Gaussian noise with zero mean and unit variance. To keep the
state y always positive, the state space must be Y D [1;1¡1] for some small
1>0.7
Our goal is to study the asymptotic behavior of Eq. (10) as ¾ converges to
zero. The state y 2 Y is called a stochastically stable equilibrium (SSE in short)
if, as ¾ ! 0, the limiting density assigns positive probability to every small
neighborhood of y. Theorem 2 of FY shows that computation of the SSE can
be done by ﬁnding the minimum of a suitably deﬁned potential function. The






Combining all the arguments implies that the problem is to ﬁnd y 2 [0;1]
minimizing U.y/. The following proposition provides the selection criterion
according to the SSE notion.






k , where the
weights are deﬁned by
wk ´
6k.n ¡ k C 1/
n.n C 1/.n C 2/
for k D 1;:::;n;. 12/
then y D 1 is the unique SSE. If the inequality is reversed, y D 0 is the unique
SSE. In the nongeneric case of equality, the SSE can be either y D 0 or y D 1,
with the limit distribution placing probability half on each.
4. STATIC SELECTIONS
4.1. Global Perturbation
The global perturbation approach of Carlsson and van Damme (1993a) is
based on a perturbation of the players’ payoff information in 2 £ 2 games.
The game to be played is determined by a random draw from some subclass
of all 2 £ 2 games. Each player observes the selected game with some noise
and then chooses one of his two available actions. If the initial subclass of
7 FudenbergandHarris(1992)avoidthisboundaryproblembyaddingthestochasticnoisetoEq.(8)
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games is large enough and contains games with different equilibrium structures,
iterativeeliminationofdominatedstrategiesintheincompleteinformationgame
yields a surprising result. When the 2 £ 2 game actually selected by Nature is
a coordination game, iterated dominance forces the players to coordinate on the
risk dominant equilibrium, if the amount of noise in the players’ observations is
sufﬁcientlysmall.CarlssonandvanDamme(1993b)consideraclassofn-person
binary choice games that are described in the Introduction of this paper. They
analyzetheglobalgameinwhichthevalueof x isobservedwithsomenoiseand
show that the derived selection rule differs from the HS’s risk dominance. We
apply CvD’s idea to n-person generalized coordination game G.n;5/deﬁned
in Eq. (1). Notice that the n-person stag-hunt game studied by CvD is a special
class of our game.
Nature draws µ, which determines the payoff matrix. Each player i receives
a private signal µi that provides an unbiased estimate of µ with some noise.
After observing their own signals, players then choose either H or L. Payoffs are
determinedbythetruegameandtheplayers’choices.Let2beaone-dimensional
random variable and let fEign
iD1 be an n tuple of i.i.d. random variables, each
having zero mean. The Ei is independent of 2, with a continuous density and a
support within [¡1;1]. For ">0, write
2
"
i D 2 C "Ei:. 13/
That " D 0 implies that the true payoff realization µ is common knowledge. We
are interested in what happens when " is arbitrarily small, namely under almost
common knowledge.





n.µ//. We conﬁne our attention to
the perturbations that satisfy the following two conditions.
Assumption 1. (a) For each k, the function pH
k (resp. pL
n¡k) is continuous,
monotonically increasing (resp. decreasing) in µ, and unbounded above and
below; (b) the original unperturbed game G.n;5/ obtains with µ D 0, i.e.,
P.0/ D 5.
Let us deﬁne N µ ´ minfµ j pH.µ/ ¸N p L .µ/g and µ ´ maxfµ j pL.µ/ ¸
N pH.µ/g, where pa.µ/ D minfpa
k.µ/ j 1 · k · ng and N pa.µ/ D maxfpa
k.µ/ j
1 · k · ngfora 2f H ;L g .Assumption1(a)aboveguaranteesthatµ and N µ exist,
and that ¡1 <µ<0<N µ<C1. Clearly, if µ is greater than N µ and the value
of µ is common knowledge among all players, strategy H is strictly dominant
in a game with payoff matrix P.µ/. Similarly, if µ<µ , strategy L is strictly
dominant. The next assumption guarantees that the possibility of each strategy
being strictly dominant is real.
Assumption 2. The 2 is uniformly distributed over an interval which con-
tains [µ; N µ].214 YOUNGSE KIM
The realized value µ is almost common knowledge if " is positive but tiny.
Lack of common knowledge, together with A2, suggests applying an iterative
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. The next lemma shows that the
Bayesian Nash equilibrium has the cutoff property and that the game considered
here is indeed dominance solvable.
LEMMA 3. If A1 and A2 hold, then the equilibrium is characterized by cut-
off µGP such that player i optimally chooses H (resp. L) iff µi > (resp. <)








Recall from A1(b) that the perturbed game corresponds to the original unper-
turbed game G.n;5/when µ D 0. We are interested in what happens at µ D 0
when the true payoff is almost common knowledge. Recall from Eq. (13) that
jµij <"if µ D 0. So if µGP <(resp. >) 0, then µi >µ GP for all i when µ D 0
and" issufﬁcientlysmall;henceallplayersshouldoptimallyplayH(resp.L)by
Lemma 3. So we say that the equilibrium H in the unperturbed game is robust
with respect to global perturbation if µGP <0, and that L is robust if µGP >0.
Now the main result of this section follows.






k , where the




; k D 1;:::;n;
then H is robust with respect to global perturbation. If the inequality is reversed,
then L is robust.
4.2. Risk Dominance
We now turn to Harsanyi and Selten’s (1988) notion of risk dominance. The
deﬁnition of risk dominance is based on a hypothetical process of expectation
formation starting from an initial situation, where it is common knowledge that
eithertheequilibriumHorLmustbethesolutionwithoutknowingwhichoneis
the solution. Roughly speaking, the coordinated equilibrium H risk-dominates
the other coordinated equilibrium L if the net gain from coordination with H
is relatively larger than that with L. Net gain again is deﬁned as the payoff
from successful coordination minus the loss incurred when all the opponents
collectively choose the other action. This implies that risk dominance measures
“risk”fromtakingaparticularactioninatooextrememanner.Thus,therelevant
thresholdvalueis¡Á1/.Án¡Á1/,whereÁk D ¼ H
k ¡¼ L
n¡kC1.Recallthatthepayoff
difference function, 8 deﬁned in Eq. (2), is monotone increasing and satisﬁes
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We can easily check that Eq. (14) becomes linear in payoff matrix if n D 2,
but it is nonlinear if n exceeds two. CvD (1993b) calculate the risk dominant
equilibrium in n-person stag-hunt game, which is a special class of the game
studied in this paper.
5. DISCUSSION
We summarize the dynamic selection criteria characterized in previous sec-
tions. Recall that 5 is payoff matrix, 8 is the payoff difference function deﬁned
in Eq. (2) and Ák ´ ¼ H
k ¡ ¼ L
n¡kC1. In the game G.n;5/, each model in paren-






























6k.n ¡ k C 1/





k ] > 0:
Weofferbriefcommentsonhowselectionmechanismsdiffer.InKMRandFY,
the constant ﬂow of nonnegligible noises play a crucial role in selecting among
strict equilibria. This allows the dynamical process to always restart. Hence, the
resulting stochastic process is ergodic, which in turn implies that each state is
eventually visited with probability one. What matters is how often the different
states are visited over a long time period. Both papers show that the dynamic
process assigns virtually all the probability to the risk-dominant equilibrium in
two-by-two games. Exactly which equilibrium is selected depends crucially on
details of noise distribution. In FY, it is the drift term depending on the payoff
difference in Brownian motion that leads to the present result. In KMR, it is the
state-independent rate of mutation that makes only sizes of basins of attraction
relevant.8 MM investigate equilibrium selection in two-by-two games, using
an explicit adjustment process. They impose perfect foresight, and there is no
mutation. The perfect-foresight restriction turns out to be sufﬁcient to elicit a
unique equilibrium, which is risk-dominant in two-by-two games.
8 It has been recognized that the selection equilibrium is sensitive to details of noise process. Bergin
and Lipman (1994) verify the following result: in KMR and Young, if one allows mutation rates to
vary with the state of the system, then it is always possible to introduce mutation process in such a way
that, given any strict Nash equilibrium, the unique invariant distribution with mutations converges to
that equilibrium as mutation vanishes. Vaughan (1994) shows that the FY-type stochastic differential
equation approach may lead to different selections if the drift term is assumed to be state dependent.216 YOUNGSE KIM
Now we elaborate on what makes three dynamic selections equivalent for
two-by-two games but not for more general games. Recall that the state y 2 Y
denotes the population fraction choosing action H. Also recall that the payoff
difference function, 8.y/, is strictly increasing in y 2 [0;1], and that 8.0/ D
¼H
1 ¡¼L
n < 0 <¼ H
n ¡¼ L
1 D8.1/.Thisimmediatelyimpliesthatauniquecutoff
exists such that 8.y/ D 0. Both MM and FY dynamics use weighted integrals
of payoff difference along a potential path. To be more speciﬁc, in MM, Eq. (15)
in the Appendix implies that there is a path from y D 0 (everyone chooses
action L) to y D 1 (everyone chooses H) as people become increasingly patient
if and only if the area below and above 8.y/ is positive. In FY, the integrand is
y.1 ¡ y/8.y/, which is a symmetric sign-preserving transformation of 8.y/.
Hence, the system Eq. (10) stays almost surely in the neighborhood of y D 1
if and only if the area below and above y.1 ¡ y/8.y/ is positive. On the other
hand, in KMR, the threshold for different basins of attraction matters. More
speciﬁcally, a unique long run equilibrium is y D 1 (everyone chooses H) if and
only if 8.y/ cuts the horizontal axis at a point less than a half. If 8.y/ is linear
in y, then the condition that the integral value of 8.y/ is positive is equivalent
to the condition that 8.y/ cuts the horizontal axis at a point less than a half.
If 8 is not linear, there is no guarantee of equivalence. But if the underlying
game is two-person game, 8 is linear, but not if the game involves more than
two players.











































This inequality is the well-known condition that the equilibrium H is risk-
dominant in two-by-two games. It is also immediate to show that, if n ¸ 3,
all equivalences break, except that between the MM selection and the CvD se-
lection. As a counterexample, let us take the stag-hunt game described in the
Introduction, where n D 3 and · D 3 (i.e., a three-person game under minimum
rule). Applying the above formula to this game at hand, we can show that each
approach selects the equilibrium L if and only if the payoff from action L, x,COORDINATION EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 217
is larger than 1
3 [MM] and [CvD], 1
4 [KMR], 3
10 [FY], and .
p
5 ¡ 1//2 [HS],
respectively. Arguments thus far yield the following main result.
PROPOSITION 5. Consider the game G.n;5/. If n D 2, then all ﬁve ap-
proaches select the risk-dominant equilibrium. If n ¸ 3, the equivalences break.
One may remark that the MM dynamic and the CvD global game approach
generatethesameselectioncriteria.Wesuspectthatthisequivalencealsobreaks
iftheuniformityassumptionA2isrelaxed.NoticefromEq.(17)intheAppendix
that the weight 1/n in the CvD formula emerges owing to the following reason:
the probability that a certain number of opponents receive signals larger than my
signal is independent of the exact location of my signal. But this property holds
only when the distribution of true parameters is uniform.
Thispapermayalsohavesubstantialimplicationswithregardtorecentexperi-
mentalresultsbyvanHuycketal.(1990,1991).Theexperimentsareasfollows.
Each treatment lasts for 10 stages. At the end of each treatment, subjects are
paid the sum of their payoffs in the games they play. In each of the games, each
player chooses among seven effort levels. In each stage, each player’s payoff is
determined by his own effort and a simple summary statistic. This statistic is
either the minimum or median of group effort choices. The parameter values are
given for the normal forms to be of coordination games with seven strict Pareto-
ranked symmetric Nash equilibria. A large group consists of 14 to 16 players.
One interesting result was that, in large group minimum treatments, subjects
initially chose widely dispersed efforts and then rapidly approached the Pareto
worst equilibrium. We claim that our results can capture this aspect. To this end,
consider the stag hunt game in which n D 15 and · D 15. Applying the selec-
tion formula to this game, then numerical calculations show that each approach




6. MORE GENERAL GAMES
The class of games we look at is admittedly restrictive, since only binary
choices are allowed. Extension to a class of games with more than two actions
would be not only complicated, but the equilibrium selection would be often
impossibleduetothetypicalintransitivityamongstrictNashequilibria.Westudy
an interesting class of generalized pure coordination or simply “voting games,”
in which intransitivity does not arise. We deﬁne a voting game G.n;mI5·/,
where n is the number of players, m is the number of choices, and the voting





as if ].s/ ¸ ·
0 otherwise;
where ].s/ denotes the total number of players choosing action s, and · may be
2;:::;n. Moreover, all coordinated equilibria are ordered, that is, 0 < as · as0,
8s < s0. The game G.n;mI5·/ possesses m pure strategy Pareto rankable
Nash equilibria, where everyone chooses action s D 1;2;:::;m. It requires that
both the voting rule (represented by ·) and the security (normalized to zero) be
identical over all choices.9
Now we have the following.
PROPOSITION 6. Allthreedynamiccriteria,namelyMM,KMR,andFY,select
the Pareto efﬁcient Nash equilibrium in any G.n;mI5·/.
The proof in the Appendix is lengthy, but the idea is intuitive. The previous
sections suggest that Pareto efﬁciency is guaranteed when the number of actions
istwo;i.e.,m D 2.Withthreeormoreactions,weapplytheselectioncriterionin
a pairwise way. The only case that we have to worry about is lack of transitivity,
but this cannot occur in the class of games considered. The proposition implies
that players eventually learn to play the efﬁcient outcome in voting games. This
observation is consistent with van Huyck et al.’s (1990) experimental results
with pure coordination games, showing that actual subjects move swiftly to the
Pareto best equilibrium effort level, regardless of group size.
7. CONCLUSION
We have generalized results on equilibrium selection in the direction of group
size.However,theassumptionofbinarystrategiesisobviouslyrestrictive.Effort
is needed to generalize in encompassing multiactions. Pairwise comparisons
may be a natural criterion, but we have to restrict the class of games, in order to
preservetransitivity.AsisshowninSection6,ageneralizedpurecoordinationor
voting game preserves such transitivity. On the other hand, it is easy to construct
a game in which transitivity does not hold. Young (1993) analyzes a two-person
three-actiongamewherepairwiseriskdominancefailsbut,nevertheless,aunique
longrunequilibriumexists.Thisfactsuggestsmodiﬁcationorreﬁnementofrisk-
dominance. Ellison (1994) characterizes KMR-style long run equilibria in two-
person multiaction games. More importantly, he shows that Morris, Rob, and
Shin’s (1995) reﬁnement of risk-dominance, called 1
2-dominance, is a sufﬁcient
condition for an equilibrium to be the unique long run equilibrium.
9 We can easily construct counterexamples demonstrating the fact that both identical rule and equal
security are necessary and sufﬁcient to guarantee the Pareto efﬁciency.COORDINATION EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 219
A more important research agenda will be to clarify the general relationship
between the nature of the underlying dynamics and selected static equilibrium.
Recent papers, such as Binmore, Samuelson, and Vaughan (1995) and B¨ orgers
and Sarin (1993), attempt to address such an issue. Binmore et al. emphasize the
importance of the order in which certain limits are taken and of the time span
over which one desires to study the behavior of the selection model. B¨ orgers and
Sarinshowthat,inthecontinuoustimelimit,aversionofastochasticaspiration-
basedlearningmodelcoincideswiththedeterministic,continuoustimereplicator
dynamics. We will have to await further research in these directions for answers.
APPENDIX
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose, to the contrary, that the pure strategy proﬁle
of exactly k players choosing H and .n ¡ k/ players choosing L is a Nash




n¡kC1 hold for such k. Adding










which contradicts the deﬁnition of the set Ä.
Characterization of the vector ® and ¯. Equations (4) to (6) deﬁne the sets










;¯ k . n ;½/´® n¡kC1.n;½/:
The following lemma characterizes the properties of the coefﬁcient vectors.




kD1 ¯k D 1, 8½; (b) ®kC1 >
®k and ¯kC1 <¯ k ,8 k ,½2. 0 ; 1 / ; (c) lim½!0 ®k D lim½!0 ¯k D 1/n, 8k;
(d) lim½!1 ® D .0;:::;0;1/;and lim½!1 ¯ D .1;0;:::;0/.
Proof. (a) Via mathematical induction. Checking the case ofn D 2 is trivial.
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The fact that
Pn
kD1 ¯k D 1 is trivial since the elements of the vector ¯ are just a
rearrangement of those of ®. To check (b), (c), and (d) is straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 2. First of all, notice that 8.0/ D ¼H
1 ¡¼L
n < 0 <8 . 1 /D
¼H
n ¡¼ L
1 and that 8 is strictly increasing, since
8









n¡k¡2[ÁkC2 ¡ ÁkC1] > 0
by the deﬁnition of the Á function and the non-decreasing property of the ¼k
sequences.
The outcome H can be upset when players have an incentive to deviate for a
feasible path from y D 1. Because of the monotonicity of 8, the incentive to
deviate is the strongest if all players are anticipated to switch from H to L in the
future, i.e., yt D e¡¸t. Hence, the condition for y D 1 being fragile is





¡.¸Cr/s ds · 0;





½ dy ·0:. 15/
Using Eq. (2), the deﬁnition and properties of the beta and gamma functions10
and some algebraic manipulation, Eq. (15) becomes











































which corresponds to the condition deﬁning the Ä0 set.
10 Refer to any text on mathematical statistics.COORDINATION EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION 221
We claim: y D 0 is globally accessible if and only if 5 2 Ä0. To prove the
“if” part, it sufﬁces to show that, if Eq. (16) holds, i.e., 5 2 Ä0, a feasible path
from y D 1t oyD0, yt D e¡¸t, satisﬁes the equilibrium condition, i.e., Vt · 0
8t along the path. This can be checked as follows:










¡.¸Cr/s ds · 0 8t:
To prove the “only if” part, it sufﬁces to demonstrate that, if 5 2 ÄnÄ0, the
equilibrium path is unique and converges to y D 1 for y0 sufﬁciently close to 1.
Reminding that any feasible path from y0 satisﬁes yt ¸ y0e¡¸t,w eg e t






Since the right-hand side is strictly positive at y0 D 1 and continuous in y0,i ti s
still positive for y0 sufﬁciently close to 1.
We also claim that y D 1 is absorbing if and only if 5 2 ÄnÄ0.T op r o v e
the “only if” part is exactly the same as to prove the “if” part of the statement
that y D 0 is globally accessible iff 5 2 Ä0. Similarly, to prove the “if” part
is exactly the same as to prove the “only if” part of the statement that y D 0i s
globally accessible iff 5 2 Ä0.
Similarly, the condition for y D 0 being fragile combined with the change of
variable technique will be
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which is the condition deﬁning Ä1. A symmetric argument as before shows that
y D 1 is globally accessible if and only if 5 2 Ä1 and that y D 0 is absorbing
if and only if 5 2 ÄnÄ1.
Combining all the facts shown yields the desired result.
Proof of Proposition 1. Part (a) is clear from Lemma 2(b) and (c). As ½ !
1, Lemma 2(d), together with Eq. (1) implies that both Ä0 and Ä1 converge to
the empty set, while Ä01 converges to the whole set Ä.
To prove Proposition 2, the following two lemmas are helpful.
LEMMA 5. For N sufﬁciently large, 8N.y/ D 0 has the unique root in [0;1].
Proof. Differentiate 8N deﬁned in Eq. (2) with respect to y, expand the










yk.1 ¡ y/n¡k¡2.ÁkC2 ¡ ÁkC1/ C C/N
Qn¡1
iD1.1 ¡ i/N/
Here the constant C is obtained from the exact expansion by replacing y and
1/N with 0’s (resp. 1’s) if the coefﬁcient Ák is positive (resp. negative). Note
that the ﬁrst term of the numerator and the denominator are strictly positive,
regardless of N. For any ²>0, the second term C/N > ¡² for N sufﬁciently
large. Hence, 8.y/ is increasing in y for N large enough. It is trivial to show
that 8.0/<0<8 . 1 / . Combining these facts yields the desired result.
LEMMA 6. For N sufﬁciently large and any Darwinian deterministic dy-
namic, the limit distribution for G.n;5/puts probability one on 1 if y¤ < 1
2, or
probability one on 0 when the inequality is reversed.
Proof. The same as that of KMR’s Theorem 3; thus it is omitted.
Proof of Proposition 2. In principle, we can calculate the unique root y¤ as
a function ofn,5, and N, and then see what happens to the equation y¤.N/ D 1
2
as N becomes large. But this procedure is rather complicated. The trick is to
plug y D 1/2 directly into the equation 8.y/ D 0, and then see what happens in
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Proof of Proposition 3. The problem is miny2[0;1]U.y/, where the potential
functionU isdeﬁnedinEq.(11).Weclaimthatthisisequivalenttothefollowing
problem: to choose y D 0i fU. 1 />0, and choose y D 1i fU. 1 /<0. Notice
that¡U.y/isthevalueofintegralofthefunctionx.1¡x/8.x/over[0; y].Since
8 is strictly increasing and 8.0/<0<8 . 1 / , it is clear that ¡U.1/>¡ U. y /
forany y 2 [0;1/.Hence,if¡U.0/>0,themaximum¡U.1/obtainsat y D 1.





























n.n C1/.n C 2/
Ák:
Let insert Ák ´ ¼ H
k ¡ ¼ L
n¡kC1 into the above expression and multiply both sides
by six in order to make the weights sum to one.
Proof of Proposition 4. NoticethattheexistenceanduniquenessofsuchµGP
are guaranteed by Assumption 1(a) and 1(c). As was suggested, we maintain the
assumption that no player will choose strictly dominated strategies. Playeri will
certainly choose H if µi > N µ: Since the expected value is E.2 j µ"
i D µi/ D µi,
player i knows that H is strictly dominant at each such observation.
Consideranobservationµi ofplayeri slightlybelow N µ,suchbethatjN µ ¡µij <
2". Player i knows that his opponent will play H if µj > N µ; hence, i’s payoff if
he chooses H at µi is approximately
n X
kD1
Pr.µj >µ i for exactly k ¡ 1 opponents j 2
"
i ¼ N µ/p
H




Pr.Ej > Ei for exactly k ¡ 1 opponent/p
H








k .N µ/: (19)
Assumption 2 allows us to conclude that the probability in the Eq. (17) is inde-
pendentofµi,atleastaslongasµi lies" insidethesupportof2.Thisobservation
allows us to conclude that this probability must be equal to the a priori probabil-
ity that Ei is the .k C1/th smallest among the errors. Thus, Eq. (18) ensues, the224 YOUNGSE KIM
probability in which is clearly the same for all players. This fact, combined with
the assumption that the i.i.d. of Ei has a continuous density, yields Eq. (19).








calculated above by the monotonicity assumption 1(a). Hence, if µGP < N µ, there
exists N µ1 such that H is strictly dominant for any µi > N µ1 in the reduced game
where player j is constrained to play H when µj > N µ. In a similar way one can
construct N µ2 < N µ1 and continuing inductively, we can ﬁnd sequences N µm such
that H is iteratively dominant for µi > N µm.
On the other hand, starting from the maintained assumption that action L
will be chosen when µi < µ, we inductively ﬁnd a sequence µ
m such that L is
iteratively dominant for µi < µ
m. By the deﬁnition of µGP, it is obvious that
N µm # µGP and µ
m " µGP as m !1 .
Proof of Proposition 6. (1)MM.AlltheproofsofSection3.2applystraight-
forwardly, so we omit them. After all, we are able to show that: if ½ 2 .0; N ½]
for some N ½>0, then the Pareto efﬁcient outcome is uniquely absorbing and
globally accessible.
(2)KMR.Letzs denotethenumberofplayerschoosingstrategys D 1;2;:::;
m.Giventhechancetomoveandthestatez D .z1;:::;zm/,theexpectedaverage
payoff for the player who has been choosing action s is calculated as
f·.zs ¡ 1/as if he chooses s again
f·.zs0
















and z 2 Z ´f n¡1 ;n ;:::;N¡ng. The next lemma is just a technical result
but plays an important role in what follows.
LEMMA 7. For any ·, the function f·.z/ is strictly increasing in z 2 Z.
Proof. We ignore the denominator of Eq. (21), since it is positive indepen-
dently of · or z.I f·Dn , it is straightforward to show that
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If · D n ¡ 1, then













































Likewise, we can show









which is positive for any z 2 Z. Since f·.z/> f ·. z¡1 /for all z 2 Z and for
any ·, we obtain the desired result.
LEMMA 8. Any mixed strategy is unstable.
Proof. Assume not; i.e., there exist s;s0 2 C.z/ with s < s0, and both s and
s0 are best responses to z. Then we get
f .z
s0
¡ 1/as0 ¸ f .z
s/as > f .z
s ¡ 1/as ¸ f .z
s0
/as0 > f .z
s0
¡ 1/as0:
The strict inequalities follow from Lemma 7 and the weak inequalities follow
from the presumed optimality of s and s0 relative to z. The contradiction estab-
lishes the desired result.
LEMMA 9. The collection of limit sets is fesgm
sD1, where es is the state of all
population choosing strategy s.
Proof. The same logic as in Proposition 9(2) of Kandori and Rob (1995; KR
henceforth) applies, so the proof is omitted.




the minimum number of mutations, x, needed to switch it over into the basin of
attraction of es is determined by f .x/as ¸ f .N ¡ 1 ¡ x/as0. This represents
an immediate jump to escape the best response region of s0, and the triangular
inequality argument of KR’s Proposition 5 guarantees that no gradual escape is226 YOUNGSE KIM
less costly than this immediate jump. Note that we mutate individuals taking s0
into s, because any other mutation will only raise the transition cost more. Thus,
the cost of transition Cs0s is the minimum integer x satisfying
f .x/ ¸ f .N ¡ 1 ¡ x/.as0/as/: .22/
It has a unique root, since Lemma 7 implies that the left-hand side of Eq. (22) is
strictly increasing and so its right-hand side is strictly decreasing in x.
Since a pure coordination game G.n;mI5·/ speciﬁes 0 · a1 · a2 ·¢¢¢·
a m, we can easily check that
Cs0m < Cs0s 8s < m;8s
0 6D sI Cm;m¡1 < Cs0;m¡1 8s
0 < m ¡ 1:
Therefore,theﬁrststepoftheoptimumbranchingalgorithmasinKR,pages407–
410,istochooseaminimumcostoutgoingbranchfromeachstate,whichresults
in the system of branches .s ! m/, s D 1;2;:::;m¡1, and .m ! m ¡ 1/.
The longest branch among these is of length Cm;m¡1. Therefore we drop it and
are left with an m-tree. This completes the algorithm.
(3) FY. Due to Young’s Theorem 2 and FY’s Theorem 2, it is essentially the
same as case (2) above; thus the proof is omitted.
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